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ABSTRACT 
 
The key factor underlying China’s fast development during the last 50 years is its ability 
to master and accumulate new and more complex capabilities, reflected in the increase in 
diversification and sophistication of its export basket. This accumulation was policy 
induced and not the result of the market, and began before 1979. Despite its many policy 
mistakes, if China had not proceeded this way, in all likelihood it would be a much 
poorer country today. During the last 50 years, China has acquired revealed comparative 
advantage in the export of both labor-intensive products (following its factor abundance) 
and sophisticated products, although the latter does not indicate that there was 
leapfrogging. Analysis of China’s current export opportunity set indicates that it is 
exceptionally well positioned (especially taking into account its income per capita) to 
continue learning and gaining revealed comparative advantage in the export of more 
sophisticated products. Given adequate policies, carefully thought-out and implemented 
reforms, and skillful management of constraints and risks, China has the potential to 
continue thriving. This does not mean, however, that high growth will continue 
indefinitely. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a vast literature trying to explain China’s very high GDP growth rate and 
poverty reduction since it started its transition to the market system in 1979.
1 The three 
key stylized facts that underlie China’s high output growth rates are: first, its high growth 
rates of capital accumulation, driven by high investment-output ratios; second, a marked 
outward orientation through export-led growth policies (Felipe, Laviña, and Fan 2008);
 2 
and third, the pursuit of industrialization (in particular the production and export of 
manufactures), a key ingredient for fast growth and development (Rodrik 2006a). China’s 
miracle is that it has been able to sustain this process for three decades.
3  
In this paper we try to gain insight into China’s development by analyzing the 
evolution of its export basket since the 1960s, in particular how it has become more 
diversified and how it has shifted to products with higher income content. We argue that 
while reforms after 1979 were important because they opened the economy and provided 
incentives for the private sector to develop, they could not have succeeded without 
acknowledging the stock of capabilities that existed in the country. We show that as far 
back as the 1960s, China’s productive structure was quite complex already and this set 
the basis for the country’s future high growth. Reforms toward a market system since the 
1980s have been a key in China’s development. However, we stress the path-dependent 
nature of development and emphasize the significant knowledge that had been 
accumulated before reforms started. 
The historical experience of the advanced economies and that of Asian countries 
such as South Korea indicates that development entails a shift from dependence on 
agricultural activities (especially on farming) into reliance on modern industrial and 
                                                 
1 Average GDP growth rate for 1960–2007 was 7.82%, and 6.21% in per capita terms. For 1980–2007, the 
rates were 9.93% and 8.74%, respectively. 
2 Also, some growth accounting studies have documented that total factor productivity growth has been 
relatively high. On the contributions of factor accumulation and total factor productivity growth to overall 
growth, see, for example, Tsui, Hsueh, and Rawski (1995), Borensztein and Ostry (1996), Hu and Khan 
(1997), Young (2000), Felipe and McCombie (2002), Heytens and Zebregs (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2005), and Islam, Dai, and Sakamoto (2006). Chow (1993) and Felipe and McCombie (2010) discuss the 
pre-reform period.  
3 See the recent work by Storm and Naastepad (2005) and Lee and Mathews (2010). They emphasize 
different aspects of East Asia’s (China included) development, in particular the drive toward 
industrialization, the emphasis on capability building, export orientation, industrial targeting, and sequential 
upgrading. All of them are part of China’s story.   2
service sectors. This shift is referred to as structural transformation, and it is what leads to 
fast and sustained growth. In other words, becoming a developed country requires 
achieving sustained growth for a period of decades. In general, the only way to do this is 
through significant structural transformation.
4 
More precisely, structural transformation is the process by which countries 
change what they produce and how they do it, as well as how they move from low-
productivity and low-wage activities, to high-productivity and high-wage activities. 
Structural transformation has three components: (i) shifts in the output structure, from 
activities of relatively low productivity into high-productivity activities; (ii) shifts in the 
employment structure, typically a decline in the share of employment in agriculture;
5 and 
(iii) upgrading and diversification of the production and export baskets. It is not obvious 
how this process happens, except that in all successful cases, there has been some form of 
government intervention. In the case of China, this process did not start taking place on a 
major scale until after the Communist Revolution.
 6  
Along these lines, Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodik (2007), Hidalgo et al. (2007), 
Hidalgo (2009) and Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) have argued recently that growth and 
development are the result of structural transformation, and, crucial in their story, show 
                                                 
4 This is a point forcefully emphasized by Chang (2009a) in his critique of some recent interpretations of 
development as poverty reduction. 
5 The share of agriculture in total GDP has declined significantly, from about 60% during 1952–70, to 
slightly over 10% in recent years. However, agriculture is still the largest employer in the economy (still 
over 40% of total employment). Felipe (2009: 150–151) concludes that most of the growth in overall labor 
productivity in China during 1987–2002 was due to the growth in labor productivity within industry. The 
contributions of labor productivity growth within agriculture and within services were minimal. Likewise, 
the contribution of labor relocation from agriculture into industry to overall labor productivity growth was 
negative due to the decline in the employment share in industry during this period, while the contribution of 
labor relocation from agriculture into services was significant due to the large increase in the share of 
employment in services. Overall, the growth in labor productivity in industry plus the effect of relocation of 
labor from agriculture into services accounts for over 80% of overall labor productivity growth during said 
period. 
6 Ward (1962) notes that despite China’s great knowledge (e.g., printing and gunpowder were invented far 
ahead of the West), the break-through (i.e., modern take-off as a result of the application of science to 
economic processes), never came. She argues that “the Confucian gentleman who dominated the official 
thinking of Chinese society thought science an occupation for charlatans and fools and, therefore, not really 
respectable […] They (the Confucians) turned their backs on experiment and, in doing so, on science as 
well. So in China, for ancient glory of its culture, for all the force and vitality of its intellectual tradition, 
the scientific break-through could not occur” (Ward 1962: 48–49).   3
that not all products carry the same consequences for a country’s development.
7 The 
reality is that developing countries face serious problems when they try to become 
competitive in a new product, when they try to enter a new market, and when they try to 
shift production and exports toward more sophisticated products. Hausmann, Hwang, and 
Rodik (2007) show that the specific set of products that a country exports has important 
consequences for the pattern of development. Empirically, a measure of the 
sophistication of a country’s export basket proves to be a good predictor of future growth: 
controlling for initial income, countries with a more sophisticated export basket (also 
initially) grow faster. On these grounds, Hidalgo et al. (2007) argue that development has 
to be understood as the process of accumulating more complex sets of capabilities and of 
finding paths that create incentives for those capabilities to be accumulated and used. The 
implication is that a growth miracle sustained for several decades must involve the 
continual introduction of new goods, not merely continual learning on a fixed set of 
goods. To analyze development and structural transformation from this perspective, 
Hidalgo et al. (2007) have developed a new analytical tool called the product space. 
  In this paper, we study how China has progressed since the early 1960s as a result 
of learning and accumulating the capabilities necessary to produce and export new and 
more sophisticated products. China’s high growth rates during the last five decades, the 
result of massive investment (reaching 40–50% of GDP) and successful integration into 
the world economy through trade, only make sense in a context of high assimilation and 
absorption capabilities, increasing capacity to employ new methods of production and 
new inputs, and significant upgrading (Abramovitz 1986; Nelson and Pack 1999).
8  
We focus on two aspects: (i) the sophistication of China’s export basket; and (ii) 
the number of products in which China has acquired revealed comparative advantage 
(diversification). Sophistication and diversification capture different aspects of how 
countries progress. The first one captures the ability to export products produced and 
exported by the rich countries to the extent that, in general, they embody higher 
productivity, wages, and income per capita. The second factor captures the ability to 
                                                 
7 Certainly these claims are not new. The importance of industrialization was highlighted by Nicholas 
Kaldor (1967) and others (on this see Felipe et al. [2009]). The contribution of this recent literature is the 
methods of analysis developed. 
8 The success of China’s industrial development is a point also stressed by scholars like Brandt, Rawski, 
and Sutton (2008). Our analysis uses a different methodology.   4
become competitive in a wider range of products, measured by the number of products 
exported with revealed comparative advantage. The rationale that underlies our analysis 
is that technical progress and structural change evolve together (technical progress 
induces structural change and vice versa; they jointly lead to growth), and underlying 
both is the mastering of new capabilities. We look at these two issues at the level of 779 
products exported.
9 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an analysis of the 
sophistication and diversification of China’s export basket. Section 3 discusses China’s 
product space. Sections 4 and 5 provide an analysis of China’s future export 
opportunities. Section 6 discusses whether it can continue growing so fast, in the context 
of the risks and constraints that it faces. Section 7 summarizes the main findings and 
draws some policy implications. 
 
2. EXPORT SOPHISTICATION AND PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION 
 
Following Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodik (2007), we first calculate the level of 
sophistication of a product (PRODY) as a weighted average of the GDP per capita of the 
countries that export the product in question.
 10
  This is calculated individually for each 
product. PRODY provides a measure of the income content of a product. It is, therefore, 
                                                 
9 Data for the period 1962–76 was downloaded from the National Bureau of Economic Research: 
http://www.nber.org/data/. See Feenstra et al. (2005) for details. Data for 1977–2006 was downloaded from 















































, where xvalci is the value of  
 
country c’s export of commodity i and GDPPCc is country c’s per capita GDP. GDPPC is from World 
Development Indicators and is measured .in 2005 PPP. Therefore, the unit of PRODY is PPP dollars. We 
have calculated PRODY for the 779 products in our analysis. The product with the highest sophistication 
level is “furnace burners,” with an index of almost $40,000. The product with the lowest level is “tin ores,” 
with an index of $955. By categories, the average sophistication levels are as follows: machinery, $19,549; 
chemicals, $18,507; metal products, $15,804; forest products, $15,028; labor-intensive, $14,026; 
petroleum, $13,213; capital-intensive (excluding metals), $12,879; animal products, $12,199; raw 
materials, $10,967; cereals, $8,681; tropical agriculture, $8,363.   5
not an engineering notion. For example, a chair will have a high level of sophistication if 
it is exported by a large group of developed countries. This will simply mean that 
consumers in other countries are willing to pay a high price for the chair and therefore, 
the chair will be most likely a product with a high income elasticity. Second, we calculate 
the level of sophistication of a country’s export basket (EXPY) as the weighted average 
of the level of sophistication of the products that it exports (i.e., of the different PRODY). 
11 
Figure 1 shows the EXPY index for China and a group of comparator countries, 
as well as for some developed countries. The figure indicates that in the early 1960s, 
when China was still one of the poorest economies in the world, EXPY was about 
$10,000. By 2006, China’s export basket had achieved a relatively high level of 
sophistication, $16,757, comparable to that of Japan in 1970–75, Spain, Italy and 
Singapore in 1985–90, and Korea in 1990–95; it has already overtaken Portugal. In Asia, 














                                                 



















EXPY . Like PRODY, its unit of measurement is 
dollars in PPP terms.   6
Figure 1. Level of Export Sophistication of the Export Basket (EXPY) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 2 decomposes the level of EXPY into the contribution of Leamer’s (1984) 
categories (see appendix table 1). The figure indicates that while in the 1960s most of the 
level of EXPY was contributed to by animal and capital-intensive products, by 2006 the 
largest contributor was machinery. 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between export sophistication (EXPY) and GDP 
per capita in 2006. The graph reveals that China’s export package is very sophisticated 
given its income per capita. Felipe (2010: table 10.4) estimates that a 10% increase in 





























































our view, those who criticize today the role of export-led growth in China’s policy miss 
the point that the true driver of growth has been the superb increase in sophistication of 
its export basket. 
 



































Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Figure 3. Export Sophistication (EXPY) and GDP Per Capita, 2006 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
   8
Diversification is measured as the absolute number of products that a country 
exports with comparative advantage.
12 This is shown in figure 4, which indicates that in 
the early 1960s, China already exported a significant number of products with 
comparative advantage, 105 (out of a total of 779 in the analysis), well ahead of Korea, 
which exported only 41 products with comparative advantage, and Brazil 45. By 2006, 
China exported 269 products with comparative advantage, marginally below the number 
of products exported with comparative advantage by Italy and Spain (among the most 
diversified countries in the world), and above countries like Japan (192 products) or 
Korea (135 products). Since the 1960s, the number of products that China exports with 
comparative advantage has increased very fast. For example, between 1975 and 1980, 
China gained comparative advantage in 88 new products, and between 1985 and 1990 in 
another 68.
13 
To gain insight into the products that China exports, we have split them into 
Leamer’s (1984) categories. They are shown in table 1. The most sophisticated products 
are machinery (with an average level of sophistication PRODY of $19,549), chemicals 
(with an average PRODY of $18,507), and metal products (with an average PRODY of 
$15,804). We refer to these as “core” commodities. These three categories contain a total 
of 325 commodities (181 machinery, 95 chemicals, and 49 metal products) out of the 
total 779, with an average sophistication level of $18,705 (the average sophistication 
level of the remaining commodities is $11,794).  
                                                 
12 Specifically, this is the number of products with an index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
greater than 1. The index of revealed comparative advantage is the ratio of the export share of a given 


















RCA . The index of revealed comparative advantage can be a problematic 
indicator, especially if used for comparison of different products. For example, a country very well 
endowed with a specific natural resource can have an RCA in the thousands. However, the highest RCA in 
automobiles is about 2. 
13 These figures are the net gain, since China also lost comparative advantage in some products during the 
periods considered. The net gain is the difference between the number of (new) products in which China 
acquired comparative advantage and the number of (old) products in which China lost comparative 
advantage.   9
Figure 4. Diversification of the Export Basket 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: there is a jump in 1973–74 that  
results from the oil price shock. 
 
The table shows that China’s progression has been impressive. In 1962, out of the 
105 products exported with comparative advantage, only fourteen (or 13% of the total) 
were highly sophisticated, or “core,” products: six chemicals (three of which were 
products with a level of sophistication above $20,000; one of the other three, pyrotechnic 
articles, was exported with a very high revealed comparative advantage, 12.06), seven 
metals, and one machinery.
14 The bulk of products that China exported with comparative 
                                                 
14 The 14 products are: CHEMICALS 1. pharmaceutical goods (PRODY=$22,345, RCA=2.24); 2.woods 



























































Table 1. Export Diversification According to Leamer’s Classification 
   1962  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2006 
Petroleum  0  1  1  1  7  5  2  1  2  2  2 
Raw materials  9  8  7  10  13  15  17  16  17  12  14 
Forest products  3  6  5  4  6  4  4  5  8  7  7 
Tropical 
agriculture  15  22  25  23  22  20  15  16  15  11  10 
Animal products  18  24  22  28  30  23  21  19  18  10  10 
Cereals  13  19  24  21  25  33  28  15  15  10  10 
Labor‐intensive  18  22  32  36  54  47  61  62  66  71  69 
Capital‐intensive      
(exc. metals)  15  14  15  21  31  34  37  37  39  45  47 
Core Commodities                               
Metal products  7  7  10  9  14  10  19  20  21  20  23 
Machinery  1  4  7  8  6  6  22  36  42  54  57 
Chemicals  6  11  11  13  26  19  24  23  18  19  20 
Total  105  138  159  174  234  216  250  250  261  261  269 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Metal products include iron and steel and manufactures of metals. 
 
By 2006, the number of total products exported with comparative advantage had 
increased to 269, out of which 100 were core products (37% of the total). Of the three 
core categories, metal products has seen a steady increase, while the number of chemicals 
increased until about 1980 and then declined slightly. Naturally, there have been 
important shifts within metals and chemicals. Within the former, China has lost its 
comparative advantage in the least sophisticated metals, where it had comparative 
advantage in 1962,
16 and has gained comparative advantage in metal products that have 
significantly higher PRODY values.
17 
                                                                                                                                                 
(PRODY=$13,616, RCA=3.94); 4. chemical elements (PRODY=$13,551, RCA=2.54); 5. pyrotechnic 
articles (PRODY=$9,774, RCA=12.06); 6. essential Oil, resinoid (PRODY=$6,709, RCA=2.88); 
METALS 7. base metals indoor sanitary ware (PRODY=$21,462, RCA=1.22); 8. tubes and pipes of cast 
iron (PRODY=$20,510, RCA=1.02); 9. locksmith, safes (PRODY=$17,675, RCA=1.14); 10. nails, screws, 
etc. of iron, steel, copper (PRODY=$16,762, RCA=1.80); 11. iron and steel powders (PRODY=$14,696, 
RCA=3.23); 12. bar rods from iron or steel (PRODY=$12,897, RCA=2.05); 13. pig iron, cast iron 
(PRODY=$8,380, RCA=1.18); MACHINERY 14. railway and tramway freight (PRODY=$10,663, 
RCA=2.32). 
15 In 1962, Korea and Brazil exported fewer core products with comparative advantage, seven and three, 
respectively.  
16 Pig iron, cast iron, PRODY=$8,380; iron and steel powders, PRODY=$14,696; and bars, rods, from iron 
or steel, PRODY=$12,897. 
17 For example: “wire rod of iron or steel (PRODY=$22,634) and wire, cables, cordage, ropes, plaited bans, 
sling, and the like (PRODY=$18,478). Similarly, China has gained comparative advantage in more   11
There are two important observations to make. The first one is that China still 
exports a high number of products that are labor-intensive with comparative advantage, a 
total of 69 (the largest group). Second, the most remarkable change has taken place 
within machinery: from one single product exported with comparative advantage in 1962 
(railway and tramway freight not mechanically propelled, PRODY=$10,663, RCA=2.32), 
to 57 in 2006. China lost its comparative advantage in transport equipment for railway 
and tramway freight, but has gained comparative advantage in equipment for ships and 
boats. Moreover, it has already gained comparative advantage in most telecommunication 
and electronics equipment, as well as in a number of industrial and office equipment. The 
unweighted average PRODY of the core products exported by China with comparative 
advantage has increased from $14,741 in 1962, to $16,307 in 1980, and to $17,135 in 
2006.
18 
A comparison of China with other countries is truly revealing. Table 2 shows the 
number of products exported with revealed comparative advantage and the unweighted 
average level of sophistication (PRODY) of these products, the number of core products 
exported with comparative advantage (the ordering of the countries is based on this 
variable) and the unweighted average level of sophistication (PRODY) of these products, 
GDP per capita of the country, and the share of the number of core products exported 
with comparative advantage in the total number of products exported with revealed 
comparative advantage. As it could be expected, all of these countries are developed (see 
figure 5). Only two developing countries, China and India, make it into this list (ahead, 
of, for example, Brazil and Russia—these four countries are referred to as the BRICs; 
China is also ahead of South Korea. These countries are shown at the bottom of the table. 
See the analysis in Felipe, Kumar, and Abdon [2010a and 2010b]).  Given their relatively 




                                                                                                                                                 
sophisticated chemical products, including “provitamins and vitamins” (PRODY=$25,587) and “oxygen-
function acids, and their derivatives,” (PRODY= $24,839). 
18 The weighted (by the export shares) averages are: $7,893 in 1962, $8,096 in 1980, and $14,888 in 2006. 
This shows a clear shift to products with higher PRODY within the core. 
19 A regression of the share of core commodities exported with comparative advantage in the total number 
of products exported with comparative advantage on GDP per capita shows that China is above the line 
(2006 data).   12
Table 2. Top 20 Countries According to the Number of Core Commodities Exported 

























Germany  305  18,155  195  19,707  32,334  63.9 
USA  313  16,197  168  19,489  42,672  53.7 
Italy  309  16,015  151  19,297  28,478  48.9 
France  303  15,971  140  18,656  31,131  46.2 
Japan  192  19,063  139  19,925  31,041  72.4 
Austria  235  17,239  131  19,305  34,520  55.7 
Netherlands  278  15,720  125  19,343  35,789  45.0 
Switzerland  191  18,248  124  20,444  36,702  64.9 
United Kingdom  215  17,345  121  19,871  32,941  56.3 
Czech Rep.  255  16,042  119  18,279  21,674  46.7 
Spain  294  14,930  116  18,257  27,960  39.5 
Sweden  197  18,238  113  19,751  33,432  57.4 
Slovenia  214  16,185  104  18,549  24,766  48.6 
China  269  13,323  100  17,136  4,524  37.2 
Belgium  259  15,255  100  18,901  32,729  38.6 
Denmark  227  16,017  95  19,945  34,440  41.9 
Finland  163  17,671  94  18,922  32,056  57.7 
Poland  256  14,404  91  16,682  14,648  35.5 
India  258  12,124  88  17,557  2,416  34.1 
Slovakia  193  15,379  86  17,368  17,535  44.6 
Note:                   
Korea (Rank=22)  135  16,974  81  18,986  23,884  60.0 




113  14,054  53  15,296  12,797  46.9 
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Figure 5. No. of “Core” Commodities and GDP Per Capita 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
What does China export today? Table 3 shows the export share of the top 20 
products (exported with a share of at least 1%), their level of sophistication (PRODY), 
and the index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA). The table reveals the following: 
(i) about half of these products have a sophistication level of about $20,000; (ii) the 
products with the highest export share in China’s total exports are “parts and accessories 
for machines,” with a share of 4.68%; and “peripheral units,” with a share of 4.11%; and 
(iii) the products with the highest index of revealed comparative advantage are 
“children’s toys” (RCA=5.01), “digital data processing machines” (RCA=4.49), and 
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Machinery  20,505  4.68  2.24 
7525  Peripheral units, including control and adapting 
units 




7643  Television, radio‐broadcasting; transmitters, etc.  Machinery  22,238  3.50  1.91 
7649  Parts, nes of and accessories for apparatus falling 
in heading 76 
Machinery  21,053  3.47  2.29 






Machinery  19,579  2.58  3.81 


















7788  Other electrical machinery and equipment, nes  Machinery  16,447  1.31  1.55 
7611  Television receivers, color  Machinery  15,755  1.29  1.81 
7721  Switches, relays, fuses, etc.; switchboards and 
control panels, nes 
Machinery  16,544  1.26  1.06 













8710  Optical instruments and apparatus  Machinery  21,226  1.08  2.75 
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Figure 6. Diversification and Standardness in 2006 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Finally, we have also analyzed the extent to which the products that China exports 
are unique or not. Figure 6 graphs the number of products exported with comparative 
advantage against an index of standardness of the products exported.
20 A lower value of 
standardness indicates that the products exported are more unique (i.e., exported by fewer 
countries). The best positioned countries are those in the fourth quadrant (high 
diversification and more unique products), while the worst are those in the second 
quadrant (low diversification and standard products).
21 Figure 6 indicates that China is in 
the fourth quadrant, together with most of the developed countries. In Asia, only Japan, 
Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, and Hong Kong export more unique products than China, 
                                                 
20 Specifically, standardness is the average ubiquity of commodities exported with comparative advantage 







, where diversification is the 
number of products exported by country c with comparative advantage and ubiquity of commodity i is the 
number of countries exporting commodity i with comparative advantage (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009). 
21 The negative relationship between both variables remains when we use the number of core commodities 
or the percentage of core commodities (out of the total number of commodities exported with comparative 
advantage) instead of standardness. 
   16
but all of them export fewer products with comparative advantage. Figure 7 shows the 
relationship between standardness and GDP per capita in 2006. The figure shows that, 
given its income per capita, China has a highly unique export package. 
 
Figure 7. Standardness and GDP Per Capita, 2006 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
3. THE PRODUCT SPACE: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OR INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY? 
 
Hidalgo et al. (2007) argue that the production (and export) of different products requires 
different and very specific capabilities (resources—both human and physical—
knowledge of markets, legal system, institutions, etc.). For example, the capabilities 
required to successfully export oranges are very different from those required to export 
furniture. What differentiates these capabilities is that some of them can be easily 
redeployed into the production and export of many other products. Probably this is the 
case of different types of machinery or of electronics goods. However, there are many 
other products that require very specific capabilities that cannot be easily redeployed. 
This is the case of natural resources such as oil.  
Hildago et al.’s recently developed concept of product space encapsulates these 
ideas. The product space uses network theory to produce a graphical representation of all   17
the products exported in the world (figure 8). The different circles represent products (a 
total of 779 in our analysis). Their size is proportional to world trade. Colors represent 
different product groups. The lines that link them represent the distance between them. 
This is not a physical distance, rather it measures the likelihood that a country exports a 
product given that it exports the other one. At one extreme, a red line indicates that 
countries that export one product also export the other product with a high probability, 
while a light blue line indicates a low probability that the two products can be exported 
jointly. The rationale is that if two goods need the same capabilities, a country should 
show a higher probability of having comparative advantage in both. 
We can see that the product space is highly heterogeneous. Some peripheral 
products are only weakly connected to other products. Some groupings appear among 
these peripheral goods, such as petroleum products, seafood products, garments, and raw 
materials. These products provide countries with a nature-based comparative advantage. 
In the center of the network is a core of closely connected products, mainly machinery, 
chemicals, and capital-intensive (metal) products. Nature does not provide an advantage 
in these products. When acquired, it is man-made.    18
Figure 8. The Product Space 
 
 
Source: Hidalgo et al. (2007) 
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The heterogeneous structure of the product space has important implications for 
structural change. Products in the periphery are less sophisticated and with a lower 
income elasticity of demand for exports than those in the core. That is, not all products 
are the same qualitatively as carriers of economic development. If a country produces 
goods in a dense part of the product space, then structural transformation is much easier 
because the set of acquired capabilities can be easily redeployed to the production of 
other nearby products. However, if a country specializes in the peripheral products, this 
redeployment is more challenging, as no other set of products requires similar 
capabilities. The conclusion is that a country’s position in the product space signals its 
capacity for structural transformation. 
Now we superimpose the products that China exports with revealed comparative 
advantage onto the product space. This is shown in figure 9. For reasons of space, we 
only show the product spaces corresponding to 1962, 1980, 1990, and 2006 (product 
spaces for other years are available from the authors upon request). The products 
exported with comparative advantage are shown with black squares. The number of black 
squares is exactly the same that appears in table 1 above. The four product spaces reveal 
important changes in China’s export structure, and in particular how the country has 
managed to establish a strong foothold into the core areas of the product space. As 
discussed earlier, in 1962, China exported 105 products with comparative advantage, 
most of them outside the core: tropical agriculture, animal products, cereals, labor-
intensive, and capital-intensive (excluding metal products). China’s strength in tropical 
agriculture, animal products, and cereals remained until 1980–1985 (see table 1), when 
the number of these products exported with comparative advantage started declining. The 
strength in labor-intensive (the garment cluster) and capital-intensive products, excluding 
metal products (the textile cluster), has remained, and even increased, until now, most 
likely reflecting China’s relatively low wages.  
In 1980, at the start of reforms, China already exported a total of 234 products 
with comparative advantage, with 46 in the core (of which 40 were metals and 
chemicals), and 11 out of the latter had a sophistication level of $20,000 or above.
22 And 
                                                 
22 In 1962, out of the fourteen products in the core exported with comparative advantage, only three had a 
level of sophistication of $20,000 or above. In 1970 the number of products in the core exported with   20
certainly China had set a very strong presence in the garments (labor-intensive) and 
textiles (capital-intensive) clusters. 
                                                                                                                                                 
comparative advantage and with a level of sophistication above $20,000 had increased to eight (including 
“rails and railway track construction materials,” at $30,678), then to nineteen in 1995, and to twenty-nine in 
2006.   21
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Arguably, the most remarkable change probably occurred between 1985 and 1990 when 
China got into electronics (grouped under machinery in Leamer’s classification). As table 1 
above indicates, in 1980 and 1985, China had comparative advantage in the export of only six 
machinery products.
23 Figure 9 reveals that during the next five years, a significant change had 
taken place, as China had set a foot into the electronics area of the product space (22 machinery 
products exported with comparative advantage). Between 1990 and 2006, the number of 
machinery products exported with comparative advantage increased to a total of 57. The product 
spaces also show that China has never been a great exporter (in the sense of having comparative 
advantage) of petroleum, raw materials, and forest products. 
  While the analysis shows that China has strong revealed comparative advantage in labor-
intensive products (a total of 69 products in 2006), it also reveals that its comparative advantage 
in core products is impressive. In our view, the only way to understand this is by acknowledging 
China’s increasing capacity to master and accumulate capabilities, and the role played by 
industrial policy (table 4).
24 China started using “export processing zones” as a key strategy to 
learn (and accumulate capabilities) from foreign firms in the advanced countries when these 
restructured their global production networks (Zhang and Song 2000).
25 The landmark FDI 
legislation was the Equity Joint Venture Law of 1979 (table 5). The law was historic in that it 
signified a reversal of the political stance against economic opening, and in that it laid the 
foundation for the foreign investments that have emerged since 1979. In 1986, the State Council 
released a document entitled “Regulations to Encourage Foreign Investments” to shift the FDI 
regime from “permitting” to “encouraging” FDI. The regulations allowed export-oriented and 
technologically advanced foreign firms to enjoy various benefits relating to taxes, credit, input 
charges, labor management, export rights, and foreign exchange requirements. Foreign investors 
were required to enter joint ventures with domestic firms for technology transfer (Yueh 2009). 
                                                 
23 In 1980 these six products were: domestic electro-mechanical appliances, invalid carriages, clocks, sewing 
machines, electric filament lamps, and cycles (not motorized). In 1985 the six products were: watches, portable 
radio receivers, other radio receivers, clocks, machinery for the grain milling industry, and cycles (not motorized).  
24 There is still a debate going on about the usefulness of industrial policy. The fact is that Western developed 
countries used industrial policy since the 15th century to protect and develop the manufacturing sector. See the 
detailed analyses in Chang (2002) and Reinert (2007), and the debate between Lin and Chang (2009). In our view, it 
is impossible to understand how rich countries got rich without being aware that they heavily protected their 
industries when they were taking off. China is doing nothing different. It is simply replicating what many other 
countries, including the United States, did (e.g., set industry standards, regulations, buy-local policies, procurements, 
patent laws advantageous to domestic producers, etc.) to build their own industries. 
25 This took place after the currency realignment following the Plaza Accord (1985), which led to a significant 
appreciation of the yen.   23





Table 4. China’s Industrial Policy 
State ownership  Was extremely high as a result of Communist takeover, but thousands 
of state enterprises have been privatized or shut down as the economy 
underwent massive market restructuring. 
Subsidized credit  Still significant subsidized credit through state owned banks, directed 
at state enterprises. 
Tax incentives  Strongly biased toward foreign investment and high technology 
Tariff and nontariff protection  Levels have come down significantly with WTO entry, but still 
significant nontariff barriers. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
targeting 
Initially there was very strong control on FDI. Then, policy changed 
strategically: country opened up and favored cutting-edge investment 
in key areas. Foreign firms have come to use China both as an export 
platform, low-cost manufacturing hub, and for its large domestic 
market. The government has been effective at creating strong 
competition among foreign firms and induced them to bring best 
technologies. 
Local content requirements  Important mechanism to develop backward linkages succeed because 
of capabilities of domestic firms. 
Intellectual property rights  Weak until required to update as part of WTO accession in 2001. 
Enforcement is weak and is likely to become a very controversial issue 
in future in relations with developed countries.   
Government procurement  Important mechanism to develop national firms in many areas. Also 
effective use of national standards to support competitiveness of 
indigenous firms. 
Promoting large domestic firms  Multiple instruments used to create world-class indigenous (public 
and private) companies to compete with multinational corporations 
(MNCs) domestically and eventually abroad. 
Source: Dahlman (2009: 307) 
 
Also, the jump into the electronics cluster in the 1990s (driven by foreign firms) was the 
result of participation in global value chains (Felipe 2010: 249–252). The evidence, consistent 
with the discussion in this paper, is that China has done a great deal of impressive catching up 
through mechanisms such as “original equipment manufacturer,” “original design manufacturer,” 
and “original brand manufacturer.” This shift into electronics was possible only because China 
had previously acquired the capabilities necessary to assemble and export these goods. While 
socialist controls and regulations inhibited private enterprise, the positive legacy is that they 
provided a solid foundation for the forthcoming growth, e.g., wide access to education and 
health, highly egalitarian land distribution, increased female labor force participation, a system 
                                                 
26 We have to add the role played by the undervaluation of the yuan, in the words of Rodrik (20100), “a kind of 
industrial policy.”   24




Table 5. Major FDI laws after 1978 
Laws and Regulations  Key components 
Equity Joint Venture Law (1979)  Laid down the foundation for successive laws on 
FDI, including income tax and labor management.  
Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises Law (1986) and 
Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law 
(1988) 
Developed a legal infrastructure governing the 
three main forms of foreign invested enterprises 
(FIEs)—equity joint ventures, cooperative joint 
ventures, and wholly foreign-owned—and devising 
favorable policy treatments for FDI. 
Regulations to Encourage Foreign Investments 
(1986) 
Shifted FDI policy from “permitting” to 
“encouraging” FDI; separated FIEs into two 
categories—those qualifying for favorable 
treatments (export-oriented and technology-
advanced FIEs) and those qualifying for normal 
treatment; and qualified FIEs enjoyed benefits 
related to taxes, credit access, input charges, labor 
management, export rights, and foreign exchange 
balance requirements. 
Provisional Regulations for Guiding the Direction 
of Foreign Investment (1995, revised 1997) 
Laid out a positive and negative list of economic 
sectors and official intentions of investment 
priorities. FDI-involved projects are divided into 




What lies behind this progression? In the product space model, development is a path-
dependent process. There is no growth trajectory that acts as a “center of gravity” toward which 
the economy is inexorably and inevitably drawn. Long-run growth and development depend on a 
succession of short- and medium-term developments along a historical adjustment path. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, China had already made inroads into the core of the product space. This 
was part of China’s industrialization drive since the 1950s. It was deliberate and policy-induced, 
                                                 
27 Bardhan (2008) argues that there are three important myths about how globalization has stimulated China’s (and 
India’s) recent rapid growth. The standard argument, he claims, is that “decades of socialist controls and regulations 
stifled enterprise in India and China and led them to a dead end. A mix of market reforms and global integration 
finally unleashed their entrepreneurial energies. As these giants shook off their ‘socialist slumber,’ they entered the 
‘flattened’ playing field of global capitalism. The result has been high economic growth in both countries and 
correspondingly large declines in poverty.” Regarding China, he argues that the country had already achieved 
growth rates of about 9% per annum between 1978 and 1993, higher than those of the successful East Asian 
countries between 1960 and 1980. Regarding poverty, about two-thirds of the decline in extremely poor people 
between 1981 and 2004 had taken place by the mid-1980s. This large decline was probably related to domestic 
factors and not to global competition. These factors included: (i) a significant increase in agricultural productivity 
following decollectivization; (ii) land reform program; and (iii) increased farm procurement prices. 
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a stated objective of Chinese policymakers (Wilcox, Weatherford, and Hunter 1962: 80–100; 
Wang and Li 1995). Using data for 2000, Felipe and Estrada (2008) estimate that China’s actual 
manufacturing sector as a share of GDP in 2000, 34.5%, was about five percentage points above 
what a regression of this share on income per capita (and its square), population, and openness 
predicted, 27.5%. This is consistent with the old notion that manufacturing is the “engine of 
growth” embedded in Kaldor’s first law (Kaldor 1967; Felipe et al. 2009; see also Rodrik 
2006a), and with the fact that growth accelerations are associated with structural changes in the 
direction of manufacturing (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodik 2006). 
The heavy industrial expansion and huge capital construction projects undertaken during 
the 1950s (employing labor-using and capital-saving methods), together with the speedy 
introduction of modern technology (assistance from the Soviet Union), led to very significant 
increases in industrial production, electric power and steel output (Wilcox, Weatherford, and 
Hunter 1962: 92, table 5). We insist that we do not argue that the industrial policies before 
market reforms were introduced were completely successful. Without any doubt they led to a lot 
of waste, miscalculations, low-quality products, poor planning, and inefficiencies. It is likely the 
capabilities created were not well utilized and scarce resources were wasted under ambitious 
government policies. Our point is that the reason why in 1980 China could export 234 
commodities with comparative advantage (46 of them in the core) is that during the previous 
decades it had mastered and accumulated a large number of capabilities and know-how. Only 
this way could Chinese entrepreneurs respond to the market incentives created by the market 
reforms. For decades China protected its industry and slowly allowed it to graduate to the 
international market. Moreover, China’s trade as far back as the 1950s was “an absolutely crucial 
element (necessary, but not sufficient) in its headlong modernization. Imported machinery and 
equipment, embodying modern technology, contributes an output-raising potential that 
substantially outweighs short-run costs […] Without trade many years of painful technological 
growth would be required” (Wilcox, Weatherford, and Hunter 1962: 90–91).
28 
Can this fast process be equated with what is referred to in the literature as leapfrogging, 
that is, the idea that some stages of development can be bypassed (supported by government-led 
                                                 
28 Felipe (2009: 123–127) argues that for countries lagging behind the technological frontier, endogenous technical 
progress is partly dependent on the acquisition and mastery of more advanced production techniques from the leader 
countries, which, in turn, depends on the country’s capabilities. If technology is sector specific, its diffusion from 
the more to the less advanced countries will be faster the higher the degree of structural similarity between them.    26
industrial policy) in an attempt to move faster up the development ladder? Our view is that 
leapfrogging is not supported by careful empirical and firm-level research (Hobday 1995).
29 
Case studies suggest that firms acquire technology through a costly, difficult, and incremental 
learning process. The notions of learning and capability accumulation contradict the idea of 
leapfrogging. China’s firms did not leapfrog from one vintage of technology to another. On the 
contrary, firms engaged (and still are) in a painstaking and cumulative process of technological 
learning. The route to advanced electronics and information technology has been a long difficult 
learning process, driven by the manufacture of goods for export. Moreover, as we showed in 
table 1, of the 269 products that China exported with comparative advantage in 2006, the largest 
category was labor-intensive products (a total of 69 or 25% of the total).  
We close this section with reference to a well-known paper by Gregory Chow (1993: 
811), who argued that China’s 6% average rate of growth (of real national income) per annum 
between 1952 and 1980 was entirely due to factor accumulation and that technological progress 
during that period was absent.
 30 We do not have data going back to the 1950s, and it is possible 
that the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution inflicted significant losses in many 
areas, including a decrease in output in some years (Naughton 2008). In the early stages, China 
adopted a centrally planned economic system based on state and collective ownership of all 
means of production, and resources, outputs, and prices were controlled. Authorities prioritized 
                                                 
29 Kim (1997) described Hyundai’s efforts to produce a car after it had purchased the foreign equipment, hired 
expatriate consultants, and signed licensing agreements with foreign firms, as follows: 
“Despite the training and consulting services of experts, Hyundai engineers repeated trials and 
errors for fourteen months before creating the first prototype. But the engine block broke into 
pieces at its first test. New prototype engines appeared almost every week, only to break in testing. 
No one on the team could figure out why the prototypes kept breaking down, casting serious 
doubts even among Hyundai management on its capability to develop a competitive engine. The 
team had to scrap eleven more broken prototypes before one survived the test. There were 2,888 
engine design changes […] Ninety-seven test engines were made before Hyundai refined its 
natural aspiration and turbocharger engines […] In addition, more than 200 transmissions and 150 
test vehicles were created before Hyundai perfected them in 1992” (Kim 1997: 129).  
This is far from the notion of leapfrogging. 
30 Chow’s (1993) definition of technical progress, implicit in aggregate production function studies, is the portion of 
overall growth not due to factor accumulation. Chow estimated Cobb-Douglas production functions and technical 
progress was proxied by a linear time trend that, in his regressions, was statistically insignificant. However, see 
Felipe and McCombie (2002 and 2010). Felipe and McCombie (2010) prove that Chow’s (1993) regressions were 
dubious. He estimated Cobb-Douglas production functions for different sectors and proxied technical progress 
through a linear time trend. For reasons difficult to accept, he eliminated some years from the regressions to obtain a 
good fit. Felipe and McCombie show that the analysis and conclusions were flawed. Using his data set for the 
construction sector, Felipe and McCombie reestimated the regression and concluded, in Chow’s own terms, that 
there was technical progress. Our definition of (technical) progress, as noted in the introduction, is a process of 
accumulating capabilities that leads to an increase in the level of sophistication and diversification of the export 
basket.   27
heavy industrialization (iron and steel, chemical fertilizer, and petrochemicals) and the needed 
resources for investment in heavy industries were extracted from rural areas. However, attempts 
to increase industrial production through politically forced resource mobilization resulted in a 
wide range of misreporting by production units. Further, industrial policy in this period 
emphasized local self-sufficiency, which resulted in all local governments being involved in a 
wide range of areas; moreover, “Chinese planning was extraordinarily haphazard and unrealistic” 
(Naughton 1990: 746).
31 
Having said this, the evidence indicates that by 1980, at the time transition and market 
reforms started, China had already gained revealed comparative advantage in the export of 234 
products, of which 46 were core products, and that it had reached a level of export sophistication 
(EXPY) of $11,000, higher than that of many other developing countries today. Given that in 
1950 China was a very poor and backward economy, our interpretation of this evidence is that 
the country’s progress during the next three decades was remarkable, and difficult to square with 
the conclusion that growth had been essentially due to factor accumulation and that technical 
progress had been absent. China’s impressive progression and growth after the introduction of 
market reforms cannot be understood without factoring in the capabilities that had been 
developed and accumulated over the three decades under the planning system and prior to the 
introduction of market reforms. Without these capabilities, entrepreneurs could not respond to 
the incentives created by the market reforms.
32 We elaborate upon this in the next section. 
  Our view of China’s development is consistent with the key characteristic of 
development embedded in the product space, namely, that it is path-dependent. For developing 
countries to move fast in the product space and reach the core, they often need to defy their 
comparative advantage. In the case of China, this was done by protecting certain capital and 
technology-industries, giving them monopoly positions and subsidizing them through various 
price distortions, including suppressed interest rates. These price distortions often created 
shortages and the government had to resort to using administrative measures to allocate 
resources directly to nonviable firms in priority industries. As we noted above, these policies 
                                                 
31 Brandt, Rawski, and Sutton (2008: 569) argue that prior to market reforms “…visitors to Chinese factories 
encountered obsolete and dysfunctional products; vans and transformers that failed to keep out rainwater, sewing 
machines that leaked oil onto the fabric, power tillers rusting outside a factory that churned out fresh batches of 
unwanted inventory, and so on” (Brandt et al. 2008, p.569). 
32 We have to add that despite the erroneous agricultural policies that precipitated the famine of 1960–61, and again 
slowed agriculture during the “Cultural Revolution” of 1966–67, China’s progress in agriculture during 1962–2000 
was remarkable (Lin 1998).   28
misallocated some resources, but this does not mean that economic performance was poor. The 
conclusion is that if China had not proceeded this way, today it would be a much poorer country. 
 
4. CHINA’S “OPEN FOREST” 
 
Another complementary way of analyzing how China has progressed during the last forty years 
is by looking at the country’s (future) export opportunity set at different points in time. 
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) provide a measure of a country’s export structure that captures the 
flexibility of an economy to adapt to external shocks and encapsulates the potential for further 
structural change. This measure, which they call open forest, is a weighted average of the 
sophistication of all potential export goods of a country (i.e., those goods not yet exported with 
comparative advantage), where the weight is the density or distance between each of these goods 
and the economy’s present export basket. Density (distance) in this context is not a physical 
concept; rather, it measures how close (far) a commodity not exported with comparative 
advantage is to the country’s export basket. It is a proxy for the probability that a country can 
successfully export a “new” product (i.e., that it acquires revealed comparative advantage in it).
33 
Open forest captures the (expected) value of the goods that the country could potentially export, 
i.e., the products that it currently does not export with comparative advantage. This value, 
therefore, depends on how far the nonexported goods are from the current basket (i.e., distance, 
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, ;  ij ϕ  denotes the proximity or probability that the country will shift 
resources into good  j , given that it exports good  i ;  j PRODY  is a measure of the sophistication of product  j  
(not exported with comparative advantage), calculated as a weighted average of the income per capita of the 
countries that export it; and  j cjPRODY ω  is the expected value (in terms of the sophistication of exports) of 
exporting good  j . First, we calculate the number of products in which China currently exhibits revealed 
comparative advantage (i.e., RCA>1). Second, we calculate the sophistication of all products. Third, we calculate 
the distance between the current export basket (i.e., the products in which China has currently revealed comparative 
advantage) and each of the products not currently exported with comparative advantage. Fourth, we compute open 
forest as the sum of the multiplications density times sophistication (for the products not exported with comparative 
advantage).   29
or the probability that the country can export them) and on how sophisticated these nonexported 
goods are. 
We have calculated open forest for China and for a group of comparator countries since 
the 1960s. This is shown in figure 10. China’s open forest in 1962 was $1,003 (in thousands, 
2005 PPP$). It ranked twenty-first in the world. By 2006 its open forest had increased to $2,414, 
the ninth largest in the world.
34 
 
Figure 10. Trend in Open Forest 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
                                                 
34 The ten largest open forest values in 2006 were (in thousands, 2005 PPP$): Poland, $2,618; Spain, $2,551; India, 
$2,548; Lithuania, $2,501; Czech Republic, $2,499; Italy, $2,462; Denmark, $2,436; Bulgaria, $2,435; China, 



































































As we argued in the previous section, this phenomenal progression is the result of path-
dependency. Once China had set a foot into the core, it could diversify and upgrade its export 
basket quickly. In other words, once the country gained comparative advantage in some 
sophisticated products in the core, it became easier to “move around.” These products are “close” 
to many other sophisticated products (e.g., other types of machinery or chemicals) in the sense 
that there is a high probability that China can export them successfully (i.e., that it can acquire 
comparative advantage) because they use capabilities that are similar to the ones that the country 
already possesses. 
What about those commodities located “far” from the current basket (i.e., high distance 
and hence low probability that China acquires comparative advantage in them)? These products 
tend to be unsophisticated (e.g., natural resources, some agricultural products) and therefore 
contribute little to open forest. Therefore, even though China has gained revealed comparative 
advantage in the export of 269 products, still many of the products that it does not export with 
comparative advantage are highly sophisticated and in the core (there are 325 core products and 
China exports 100 of them with comparative advantage) and the probability of exporting them is 
high. Hence, China’s high open forest. 
  Table 6 shows the top ten contributors to China’s open forest in 2006 ($2,414,000). All of 
them are very sophisticated products (seven of them with PRODY above $30,000, and 
including—although at a high distance—the most sophisticated product in our analysis, “furnace 
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Table 6. Top 10 Contributors to Open Forest in 2006 
Commodity  Leamer’s 




Angles, shapes, sections, and sheet piling, of 
iron or steel 
Capital-
intensive 
35,177  0.350  12,299 
Pearls, not mounted, set, or strung  Labor-intensive  25,242  0.457  11,546 
Other electronic valves and tubes  Machinery  21,976  0.510  11,205 
Sulphonamides, sultones, and sultams  Chemicals  30,593  0.355  10,847 
Furnace burners; mechanical stokers, etc., and 
parts thereof, nes 
Machinery  39,521  0.273  10,781 
Sound recording tape, discs  Labor-intensive  33,809  0.310  10,475 
Safety glass consisting of toughened or 
laminated glass, cut or not 
Labor-intensive  32,232  0.322  10,367 
Bonded fibre fabrics, etc., whether or not 
impregnated or coated 
Capital-
intensive 
31,250  0.327  10,216 
Rails and railway track construction materials, 
of iron or steel 
Capital-
intensive 
30,687  0.321  9,843 
Swine, live  Animal 
products 
26,388  0.371  9,781 
Source: Authors’ calculations             
 
 
Figure 11. Opportunities for Economic Transformation: Open Forest 
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Finally, we have estimated a regression of open forest on income per capita (and its 
square), the investment-output ratio, and the number of export destinations, using data for 105 
countries for 2006. The line in figure 11 provides the expected value of open forest given income 
per capita; to draw it, we fix the investment-output ratio and the number of export destinations 
their sample’s averages, 22.7% and 132, respectively. 
 Results indicate that China’s expected (i.e., predicted by the regression) open forest 
($2,107,000), given the values of the three right-hand variables, is below the actual one 
($2,414,000). This reinforces the conclusion that China’s future is bright.  
 
5. WHAT ELSE CAN CHINA EXPORT? 
 
Given the analysis and conclusions in the previous section, we can ask “what else can China 
export?” Table 6, above, contains some of the most sophisticated products in the analysis (see 
their PRODY). This is why China has a high open forest. But can China successfully export all 
these products today? To answer this question we get back to the product space and analyze the 
products that China does not export with revealed comparative advantage. This represents 
China’s export opportunity set. In our analysis there are 509 products that China does not export 
with comparative advantage (all the products in the open forest). Therefore, these are potential 
“new” exports. They are shown in figure 12. Certainly China will not be able to export all of 
them with comparative advantage, but certainly there is still room to increase the number of 
exports with comparative advantage.
35 
Figure 12 shows how “far” each product is from the current export basket. This allows us 
to divide all these products into three groups, depending on how far they are from the current 
export basket: “nearby,” “middle distance,” and “far away.”
36 The three groups are separated by 
a dashed line. By construction of the product space, products “closest” to China’s current export 
basket, i.e., those “nearby,” use capabilities that are similar to those the country already has and, 
therefore, it should not be difficult for Chinese firms (that already export these products in small 
                                                 
35 Table 2 above shows that the United States, France, Italy, and Germany export slightly above 300 products with 
comparative advantage. 
36 Products “nearby” are those with a distance (the inverse of density) of less than 0.5 standard deviations from the 
average of all unexploited products; products at “middle” distance are those with between ±0.5 standard deviations 
from the average; and products “far away” are those with a distance of at least 0.5 standard deviations from the 
average. A longer list of products can be provided by the authors upon request.   33
amounts) to become competitive exporters of these products (i.e., increase the export share of 
these products and acquire revealed comparative advantage). These are a total of 247 products. 
On the other hand, products farther to the right require more specific capabilities and it is more 
likely that Chinese firms do not have these yet; therefore, their successful export today is 
probably more challenging. There are total of 262 products in the two groups (171 “middle 
distance” and 91 “far away”). 
Table 7 shows the top ten products nearby, the top five products at middle distance, and 
the top five far away, ordered by sophistication (PRODY), the Leamer category they belong to, 
and the current index of revealed comparative advantage. All these products meet the condition 
that their level of sophistication (PRODY) is above the country’s average level (EXPY). The 
table also provides the strategic value of each of these products. The strategic value of a product 
is a proxy for the spillovers derived from acquiring comparative advantage in the product in 
question. Specifically, it is the increase in open forest assuming that China gains comparative 
advantage in that product.
37 
The table shows an increasing level of sophistication in the products that China can 
potentially export successfully as one moves to the right. All the products in the table are highly 
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How can China acquire revealed comparative advantage in some of these products? 
China needs to develop and carefully implement a set of policies that allow its firms to take 
advantage of the huge potential warranted by their privileged position in the product space. 
Given the success achieved during the last fifty years, policymakers need to measure well the 
amount of intervention that they exert and think more about the quality of these interventions. 
For example, at this point, China does not need to take strategic bets, i.e., to try to gain 
comparative advantage in products that are “far away.” The country needs first to develop the 
necessary capabilities to successfully export these products. Likewise, support to new activities 
(e.g., provision of specific public inputs, tax breaks, subsidies, etc.) has to be guided by very 
clear sunset clauses and performance benchmarks, and policymakers have to learn to identify 
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Machinery  28,754  13,146  0.590 
Alkyds and other polyesters  Chemicals  24,239  14,906  0.581 
Medicaments (including veterinary medicaments)  Chemicals  22,803  13,134  0.024 
Aluminium and aluminium alloys, worked  Raw materials  22,084  13,076  0.522 
Passenger motor vehicles (excluding buses)  Machinery  21,687  13,153  0.021 
Non‐domestic refrigerators and refrigerating 
equipment, parts, nes 
Machinery  20,836  13,936  0.854 
Paper and paperboard, creped, crinkled, etc., in 
rolls or sheets 

























Machinery  30,097  16,371  0.511 
Other nitrogen‐function compounds  Chemicals  29,237  15,996  0.303 
Paper and paperboard, coated, impregnated, etc., 
in rolls or sheets 
Forest products  28,853  15,763  0.258 
Parts, nes of the machines falling within heading 
725 












Machinery  25,779  15,552  0.412 
Furnace burners; mechanical stokers, etc., and 
parts thereof, nes 
Machinery  39,521  14,696  0.505 
Organo‐sulphur compounds  Chemicals  31,440  14,221  0.485 
Nonmechanical or electrical instruments for 
physical, etc., analysis 
Machinery  28,222  14,194  0.224 
Machinery, accessories for type‐setting, for 
printing blocks, etc. 














Machinery  25,192  14,143  0.362 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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In our view, China needs to devise an optimal combination of horizontal and vertical 
policy instruments.
38 The objective of the first type of policies is to resolve economy-wide 
market failures that affect broad sectors of the economy (e.g., provide subsidies to innovation, 
relief financial constraints for SMEs), while the second aim at developing new comparative 
advantages by promoting specific new activities (these are the products labeled “nearby” and 
“middle” in table 7). To increase the possibility of success, China’s government needs to tailor 
policies and tools to each sector and then implement these policies in close collaboration with the 
private sector, which needs to be nurtured. Therefore, the spectrum of interventions is relatively 
large, ranging from a hands-off approach (e.g., simply creating the necessary market institutions) 
to acting as a central operator in a sector. Experience shows that coordination with the private 
sector increases the chances of policy success. 
Moreover, the more China becomes a market economy the more it will have to pay 
attention to market failures. Indeed, the discovery of new products is subject to market failures 
that result in the under-provision of entrepreneurship in pursuit of structural change (Hausmann 
and Rodrik 2003). Two market failures in particular are rampant in developing countries, 
namely: (i) information externalities incurred in discovering the cost structure of an economy, 
i.e., discovery of the new activities that can be exported profitably;
39 and (ii) coordination 
externalities in the presence of scale economies.
40 Both are reasons why diversification and 
discovery are unlikely to take place in a market economy without some kind of government 
action. China has been heavily involved in supporting its industry for decades. However, as it 
advances in its quest to become more a market-oriented economy, the role of the state should be 
to create a climate of collaboration with the private sector more than to provide subsidies. 
 
 
                                                 
38 I do not want to overstretch the distinction between horizontal and vertical industrial policies, as often it is 
difficult to differentiate both. On this see Chang (2009). 
39 Information externalities derive from the fact that searching for a new product is an activity with great social 
value, one that is but poorly rewarded. If entrepreneurs fail in their attempts, they will have to bear all the search 
costs. However, if they succeed, other producers/exporters will quickly learn and follow them. In this case, there is a 
clear case for the government to subsidize investments (to the initial investor) in new, nontraditional activities, and 
not in activities already established.  
40 Coordination externalities derive from the fact that many projects require simultaneous investments in order to be 
profitable (e.g., hotels will not be built unless the government provides good public infrastructure, but the 
government will not build infrastructure unless the private sector builds the hotels). Coordination failures often do 
not need subsidies to the private sector.   37
6. WILL GROWTH CONTINUE INDEFINITELY? RISKS, CONSTRAINTS, AND 
SCENARIOS 
 
The analysis in the previous sections indicates that China’s growth will remain strong, but it 
should not be overstretched, as the country faces a number of serious challenges. Indeed, the 
perennial questions in discussions about China’s performance are, first, whether growth will 
remain fast (at about 10% per annum) in the longer term, and second, and related, whether the 
challenges that it faces will prove to be an insurmountable barrier.
41 Moreover, is high growth 
desirable? Growing fast has both pros and cons. China’s problem is how to transform the 
countryside, where hundreds of millions of people still live and are mostly engaged in 
agriculture. While high growth is still important to lift living standards, it may not be a sufficient 
condition for high employment creation. Moreover, it may lead to imbalances and inflation.  
Our argument, developed in previous sections, is that China has amassed a huge stock of 
capabilities that are key to continue growing. But this analysis should not be misconstrued: thirty 
years of high growth does not imply unending growth. In fact, in our view, a more appropriate 
statement is that it means that the probability that China continues to grow at 10% per annum is 
diminishing. Naturally this will have consequences. In our view, there are three important 
risks/constraints that policymakers should be aware of, as they will affect the country’s long-
term performance. First, China’s economy is in a state of delicate balancing in many fronts, 
including coastal-interior/urban-rural areas and across income groups. It is well-known that 
inequalities are on the rise. One key policy concern is how to redistribute wealth from the 
wealthier to the poorer areas. Second, there are serious environmental concerns. Third, while on 
many fronts China appears to be a market economy, it is not in many important aspects, 
including the allocation of capital.
42 Given these issues, there are three possible scenarios for the 
medium-to-long term, 2010–2030:  
(i) China continues registering very high growth rates (10% and above) much longer. 
This is very unlikely. Growth during the previous thirty years has done wonders. 
However, it has also created imbalances and inefficiencies; 
                                                 
41 Zeng and Wang (2007) provide a very useful SWOT analysis of China. They highlight China’s weak institutions, 
low overall educational attainment, weak indigenous innovation capacity, and poor linkages between research and 
development and industry. 
42 Felipe et al. (2008) show that the productivity of capital has been on a downward trend for a long time.   38
(ii) a controlled deceleration that results in an average annual growth for the twenty-year 
period of about 5% (Felipe, Kumar, and Abdon 2010c). As argued here, what underlies 
China’s high growth during the last decades is the massive accumulation of capabilities. 
The rate of accumulation will decline. As Felipe et al. (2010c) argue, for China to 
continue growing at 8–10% per annum during the next twenty years, it would have to 
continue gaining comparative advantage in more products and increasing the level of 
sophistication of its export package in a way that does not seem plausible. With this 
reduction in growth, China’s policymakers will have to monitor the employment 
elasticity of growth (Felipe and Hasan 2006: table 3.6);
43 or 
(iii) a serious downturn, as a consequence of, for example, a financial crisis. As China 
becomes more a market economy, this risk will increase (Minsky 2008). As argued 
above, markets do not allocate capital in China and the degree of inefficiency is high. The 
crisis can also be the result of the vertigo that the growth figures produce. To avoid a 
crisis, either growth comes down or there is a drastic reduction in consumption of 
resources per unit produced, as well as in the pattern of final consumption.
 44 This is the 
scenario to avoid as it would have very serious economic and social consequences. It is 
worthwhile trading some of the high growth for stability. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT LIES AHEAD AND WHAT CHINA SHOULD DO 
 
In this paper we have discussed China’s impressive performance since the 1960s as a result of its 
capacity to accumulate and master capabilities. China’s increasing capabilities are reflected in 
the number of products exported with revealed comparative advantage (degree of diversification) 
                                                 
43 Felipe and Hasan (2006) note that China’s employment elasticity of growth declined between the 1980s and the 
1990. While in the first decade 3% output growth generated 1% employment growth, in the 1990s the same 
employment growth required 8% output growth. 
44 Brown (2005) estimates that if China reached the level of oil consumption that the United States had in 2004, in 
2031 it (China) would need 99 million barrels/day. Note that this figure is well above total world production in 2007 
(at about 82 million barrels/day). Also, if in 2031 China consumed the same amount of paper that the United States 
consumed in 2004, it would need 303 million tons, double the world production in 2004. Finally, if each Chinese 
family owned three cars per every four persons (the same as the typical American family), in 2031 there would be 
1.1 billion cars, which would be difficult to fit into the country in the current circumstances.   39
and in the increasing sophistication of its export basket. We have used the recently developed 
product space methodology to document and analyze these changes.  
The analysis indicates that by 1962, China had acquired revealed comparative advantage 
in the export of 105 products (out of 779 in our analysis), although only 14 were “core” products 
(metals, chemicals, machinery) with a significant level of sophistication, especially taking into 
account its income per capita. By 1980, when transition started, China had already attained 
comparative advantage in the export of a significant number of products, a total of 234 (of which 
46 were core products, mostly chemicals and metals), and it already had a relatively high index 
of export sophistication (given its income level). Despite the hardship imposed by the Great Leap 
Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and all the inefficiencies of the planning system, it is difficult 
to square these gains, which had to entail significant structural transformation of the Chinese 
economy, as well as mastering of a significant number of capabilities, with lack of technical 
progress (however broadly defined). Our analysis indicates that the government’s priority 
industries did not necessarily go against China’s factor abundance, as the country has gained 
comparative advantage in the export of both labor-intensive and sophisticated products. This 
strategy has paid off, as there is no doubt that a country with an inefficient industrial sector is 
better off than one with a weak or no industrial sector at all. This evolution helps explain the 
shift that occurred during the late 1980s, when China truly set foot into the core of the product 
space and, in particular, into electronics and machinery. In 1990, the number of core products 
exported with comparative advantage reached 65. 
By 2006, China’s export basket was highly sophisticated and one of the most diversified 
in the world: it exported 269 products with comparative advantage, of which 100 were core 
products. No other developing country can match China’s spectacular performance. We have 
argued that this was the result of industrial policies that allowed the accumulation of product-
specific capabilities. In our view, if in 1950 China had tried to go “the other way,” probably 
today it would be a much poorer country. 
A measure of the future export opportunities reveals that China is extremely well-
positioned to continue performing very well. From a policy perspective, this analysis, together 
with that on sophistication and diversification, indicates that Chinese policymakers should not 
feel pressure and rush to undertake major interventions and reforms, as the country has achieved 
a relatively high level of sophistication and diversification in its export basket, as well as a very   40
large potential export opportunity set. In simple terms, “let it be.”
45 An unorthodox and 
gradualist development path, based on implementing well-focused reforms in key areas (Rodrik 
2006b) while rejecting many of the so-called Washington-Consensus reforms, has served China 
very well. While the country will have to implement many reforms (e.g., labor and capital 
markets, the development of services) in the coming decades, something that policymakers know 
well, a cautious pace is still the route to follow in the medium term. The private sector could be 
invited to this process through, for example, sectoral round-tables, deliberation and investment 
advisory councils, and public-private venture funds. In the words of Brandt, Rawski, and Sutton 
(2008: 570): “Chinese experience shows that despite their undoubted benefits, neither 
privatization of enterprise ownership nor extensive deregulation, full price flexibility, rule of 
law, and other widely recommended institutional changes must necessarily precede a broad-
gauged advance of manufacturing capabilities.”  
China is implementing policies to achieve a “harmonious society” (Felipe 2010: 1–6). 
Chinese policymakers have realized that solving problems such as unemployment and 
underemployment, a deteriorating environment, or increasing inequalities, will determine how 
well the country does in the next decades (Wen 2010). Perhaps policymakers should think less in 
terms of a growth target and more in terms of employment creation (and 
unemployment/underemployment reduction) and structural transformation targets. Growth will 
be a by-product. Development is a path-dependent process and China has acquired tremendous 
knowledge and competency that will allow it to continue thriving in the next decade. This does 
not mean, however, that growth rates of 10% and above will remain forever, as China faces a 
number of constraints and risks. 
Analyzing China in the year 2030, the miracle of the previous twenty years will not be, 
most likely, that annual growth remained at 10%; rather, it should be that, in 2010, its 
policymakers well understood the country’s potential, together with the constraints and risks that 
it faced and, most importantly, that they successfully implemented a series of reforms that 
allowed the country to continue transforming. 
                                                 
45 This is an expression used by Ricardo Hausmann.   41
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Appendix Table 1: Leamer’s Classification and SITC Rev. 2 (2-digit) 
1. Petroleum     7. Labor-intensive    
   Petroleum and petroleum products  33     Nonmetallic mineral  66 
            Furniture  82 
2. Raw materials        Travel goods, handbags  83 
   Crude fertilizer and crude minerals  27     Articles of apparel  84 
   Metalliferous ores  28     Footwear  85 
   Coal  32     Miscellaneous manufacture  89 
   Gas  34     Postal packages, not classified  91 
   Electric current  35     Special transactions, not classified  93 
   Nonferrous metals  68     Coin (other than gold coin)  96 
   Gold, nonmonetary   97          
         8. Capital-intensive    
3. Forest products        Leather  61 
   Cork and wood  24     Rubber  62 
   Pulp and waste paper  25     Textile yarn, fabrics  65 
   Cork and wood  63     Iron and steel  67 
   Paper  64     Manufactures of metals, nes  69 
            Sanitary fixtures and fittings, nes  81 
4. Tropical Agriculture             
   Vegetables and fruit  05  9. Machinery    
   Sugar  06     Power generating  71 
   Coffee  07     Specialized for particular industries  72 
   Beverages  11     Metalworking  73 
   Crude rubber  23     General industrial  74 
            Office and data processing  75 
5. Animal products        Telecommunications  76 
   Live animals  00     Electrical  77 
   Meat  01     Road vehicles  78 
   Dairy products  02     Other transport equipment  79 
   Fish  03    
Professional and scientific 
instruments  87 
   Hides, skins  21     Photographic equipment  88 
  
Crude animal and vegetable 
materials  29     95 
   Animal and vegetable oils and fats  43    
Armored vehicles, firearms, and 
ammunition 
  
   Animals, live (nes)  94          
         10. Chemicals    
6. Cereals        Organic  51 
   Cereals  04     Inorganic  52 
   Feeds  08     Dyeing and tanning  53 
   Miscellaneous edible products  09     Medicinal and pharmaceutical  54 
   Tobacco  12     Oils and perfume  55 
   Oil seeds  22     Fertilizers  56 
   Textile fibers  26     Explosives  57 
   Animal oils and fats  41     Artificial resins and plastic  58 
   Fixed vegetable oils and fats  42     Chemical materials, nes  59 
 